Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy

Which factors should be included in triage? An online survey of the attitudes of the UK general public to pandemic triage dilemmas.

OBJECTIVE: As cases of COVID-19 infections surge, concerns have renewed about intensive care units (ICUs) being overwhelmed and the need for specific triage protocols over winter. This study aimed to help inform triage guidance by exploring the views of lay people about factors to include in triage decisions. DESIGN, SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Online survey between 29th of May and 22nd of June 2020 based on hypothetical triage dilemmas. Participants recruited from existing market research panels, representative of the UK general population. Scenarios were presented in which a single ventilator is available, and two patients require ICU admission and ventilation. Patients differed in one of: chance of survival, life expectancy, age, expected length of treatment, disability and degree of frailty. Respondents were given the option of choosing one patient to treat or tossing a coin to decide. RESULTS: Seven hundred and sixty-three participated. A majority of respondents prioritised patients who would have a higher chance of survival (72%-93%), longer life expectancy (78%-83%), required shorter duration of treatment (88%-94%), were younger (71%-79%) or had a lesser degree of frailty (60%-69%, all p<0.001). Where there was a small difference between two patients, a larger proportion elected to toss a coin to decide which patient to treat. A majority (58%-86%) were prepared to withdraw treatment from a patient in intensive care who had a lower chance of survival than another patient currently presenting with COVID-19. Respondents also indicated a willingness to give higher priority to healthcare workers and to patients with young children. CONCLUSION: Members of the UK general public potentially support a broadly utilitarian approach to ICU triage in the face of overwhelming need. Survey respondents endorsed the relevance of patient factors currently included in triage guidance, but also factors not currently included. They supported the permissibility of reallocating treatment in a pandemic

Race and resource allocation: an online survey of US and UK adults' attitudes toward COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine distribution

OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to assess US/UK adults' attitudes towards COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine allocation. DESIGN: Online survey including US and UK adults, sampled to be representative for sex, age, race, household income and employment. A total of 2580 participated (women=1289, age range=18 to 85 years, Black American=114, BAME=138). INTERVENTIONS: Participants were asked to allocate ventilators or vaccines in scenarios involving individuals or groups with different medical risk and additional risk factors. RESULTS: Participant race did not impact vaccine or ventilator allocation decisions in the USA, but did impact ventilator allocation attitudes in the UK (F(4,602)=6.95, p<0.001). When a racial minority or white patient had identical chances of survival, 14.8% allocated a ventilator to the minority patient (UK BAME participants: 24.4%) and 68.9% chose to toss a coin. When the racial minority patient had a 10% lower chance of survival, 12.4% participants allocated them the ventilator (UK BAME participants: 22.1%). For patients with identical risk of severe COVID-19, 43.6% allocated a vaccine to a minority patient, 7.2% chose a white patient and 49.2% chose a coin toss. When the racial minority patient had a 10% lower risk of severe COVID-19, 23.7% participants allocated the vaccine to the minority patient. Similar results were seen for obesity or male sex as additional risk factors. In both countries, responses on the Modern Racism Scale were strongly associated with attitudes toward race-based ventilator and vaccine allocations (p<0.0001). CONCLUSIONS: Although living in countries with high racial inequality during a pandemic, most US and UK adults in our survey allocated ventilators and vaccines preferentially to those with the highest chance of survival or highest chance of severe illness. Race of recipient led to vaccine prioritisation in cases where risk of illness was similar

Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism

Does ought imply can?

Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as “Ought Implies Can”. Arguably, this principle reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they claimed to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgements, obligations persist irrespective of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be warranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all

Bioinformatics challenges for genome-wide association studies

Motivation: The sequencing of the human genome has made it possible to identify an informative set of >1 million single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) across the genome that can be used to carry out genome-wide association studies (GWASs). The availability of massive amounts of GWAS data has necessitated the development of new biostatistical methods for quality control, imputation and analysis issues including multiple testing. This work has been successful and has enabled the discovery of new associations that have been replicated in multiple studies. However, it is now recognized that most SNPs discovered via GWAS have small effects on disease susceptibility and thus may not be suitable for improving health care through genetic testing. One likely explanation for the mixed results of GWAS is that the current biostatistical analysis paradigm is by design agnostic or unbiased in that it ignores all prior knowledge about disease pathobiology. Further, the linear modeling framework that is employed in GWAS often considers only one SNP at a time thus ignoring their genomic and environmental context. There is now a shift away from the biostatistical approach toward a more holistic approach that recognizes the complexity of the genotype–phenotype relationship that is characterized by significant heterogeneity and gene–gene and gene–environment interaction. We argue here that bioinformatics has an important role to play in addressing the complexity of the underlying genetic basis of common human diseases. The goal of this review is to identify and discuss those GWAS challenges that will require computational methods

Computational ethics

This is the final version. Available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this recordTechnological advances are enabling roles for machines that present novel ethical challenges. The study of 'AI ethics' has emerged to confront these challenges, and connects perspectives from philosophy, computer science, law, and economics. Less represented in these interdisciplinary efforts is the perspective of cognitive science. We propose a framework – computational ethics – that specifies how the ethical challenges of AI can be partially addressed by incorporating the study of human moral decision-making. The driver of this framework is a computational version of reflective equilibrium (RE), an approach that seeks coherence between considered judgments and governing principles. The framework has two goals: (i) to inform the engineering of ethical AI systems, and (ii) to characterize human moral judgment and decision-making in computational terms. Working jointly towards these two goals will create the opportunity to integrate diverse research questions, bring together multiple academic communities, uncover new interdisciplinary research topics, and shed light on centuries-old philosophical questions.Templeton World Charity Foundatio

Multiple carbon accounting to support just and effective climate policies

Negotiating reductions in greenhouse gas emission involves the allocation of emissions and of emission reductions to specific agents, and notably, within the current UN framework, to associated countries. As production takes place in supply chains,increasingly extending over several countries, there are various options available in which emissions originating from one and the same activity may be attributed to different agents along the supply chain and thus to different countries. In this way, several distinct types of national carbon accounts can be constructed. We argue that these accounts will typically differ in the information they provide to individual countries on the effects their actions have on global emissions; and they may also, to varying degrees, prove useful in supporting the pursuit of an effective and just climate policy. None of the accounting systems, however, prove 'best' in achieving these aims under real-world circumstances; we thus suggest compiling reliable data to aid in the consistent calculation of multiple carbon accounts on a global level